After a month of political impasse, pressure is now weighing on both president Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga to narrow down on realistic options, even though they still remain hostage to their uncompromising associates.
With the former UN chief, Kofi Annan, having started the mediation process, it is now clear for both camps that Kenyans are getting tired of the anxiety and would like to see workable solution to the dispute that followed the December 27 elections.
Even as Mr Annan was categorical that the two leaders must be prepared to take painful decisions, the main question is what hard options await them? However, both sides seem to be unanimous that the embattled Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) must be reconstituted before the next elections.
As proper negotiations took off last week, it appears that both president Kibaki and Mr Odinga have three hard options to chose from, any of which have their repercussions.
President Kibaki—has the first option of hanging on given that he was sworn in on December 30 for the second five-year term. With this comes the argument that those dissatisfied with the election results have the option of going to court.
The court option appears to be the thinking of associates, who maintain that either way, the Annan-led mediation would recognise that any step forward must be decided by the court of law. If the president takes such an option, it would be under the premise that protests currently being experienced all over the country, will fizzle out once the ordinary people realise that their lives have been interrupted by the continued unrest.
This is the strategy normally adopted by most African leaders who find their mandate questioned by the larger populace, like it happened recently in Uganda and Ethiopia.
The flip side of this option, though, is that it would render the Annan mediation worthless. President Kibaki would also find it difficult to push forward his legislative agenda because the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) enjoys the majority in parliament. To top it all, he would have to grapple with both local discontent, besides gaining international acceptance given that his legitimacy has been put in doubt.
The second option for president Kibaki is to agree for the re-tallying of the disputed presidential votes. His lieutenants have in the recent past carried out advertisements in the local newspapers with figures showing how he won the elections and challenging their opponents to prove them wrong.
However, re-tallying would open another round of long-drawn disputes following claims by his opponents that the official documents have been tampered with since the results were announced on December 30.
The third and unlikely option is for president Kibaki to step down should an independent audit prove that he did not win. This would take great show of character and moral responsibility to save the country from further ruin. Yet, the vested interests around him would not agree to such an option.
The final and realistic option—which he also shares with Mr Odinga—is to invite his opponents for a coalition government, which would mean the exclusion of Kalonzo Musyoka’s ODM-K. This is mainly because a government of national unity including all political parties could kill multi-party democracy since there would be no opposition in parliament.
On his part, Mr Odinga has three hard options from which to chose from. The first—the easiest and yet painful—is to let go of the fight and take up the position of official leader in parliament. This would be in consideration that a recalcitrant government would most likely continue cracking down on dissent resulting into deaths and loss of property. Such an option would require a delicate negotiations with his supporters and would take a great moral conscience and statesmanship.
However, Mr Odinga’s leading option—of which his supporters are in agreement—is to push for a presidential re-run. This option has gained international appeal among Kenya’s development partners given that both the protagonists have claimed victory.
The challenge, though, is whether those supportive of president Kibaki and who strongly believe he won, would agree to such an option. Should president Kibaki agree for a re-run, then it would mean setting up an interim government which would not be allowed to make major policy decisions before the dispute is settled.
Should a re-run fail, then Mr Odinga has the last option of agreeing for a coalition government with the Party of National Unity (PNU), an option those privy to the goings on within ODM, say would be the best concession he can give.
This would involved a coalition between PNU’s 43 MPs and ODM with 98 MPs, in which the ministries would be distributed according to party strengths. But for this to happen, a proper audit must be carried out to prove who actually won the elections so as to determine who wields the executive power. Secondly, a constitutional amendment must be effected to allow power-sharing.
But should all these options fail, the two sides still have a fall-back position which has come to be known as the “Burundi Approach”. Since the presidential contest was closely fought—the alleged inflated figures notwithstanding— the two sides could agree for one to run the government for the first two and a half years and then leave it to the other for the remaining period.